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Abstract
The fact that gossip can be inaccurate, intentionally or otherwise, has led to ques-
tions over its ability to build cooperation in large societies. We explore the impact
of gossip accuracy on trust and trustworthiness in a population playing decentralized,
two-player trust games. We observed non-trivial levels of spontaneous inaccuracy in
gossip, and there was evidence that this was largely due to gossipers’ desire to punish
untrustworthy players. Although this endogenous inaccuracy did not adversely a↵ect
levels of trust and trustworthiness, introducing high levels of exogenous inaccuracy
did. Importantly though, we observed greater trust and trustworthiness when highly
inaccurate gossip was present than when communication was impossible. This sug-
gests that even inaccurate gossip induces a degree of reputational concern in gossip
targets and some willingness among gossip recipients to discriminate between partners
on the basis of the gossip they received. Thus, gossip need not be perfectly accurate
to e↵ectively induce cooperation.
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1 Introduction
“Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely e cient; it saves a lot of
trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word.” Arrow (1974, p. 23)
One of the oldest problems facing organizations and societies has been how to induce
good behaviour from their members or citizens, particularly when economic exchange oc-
curs in large and/or geographically dispersed populations. In these circumstances, repeated
interactions are rare and it is very costly for any one individual to observe and keep track
of the behaviour of others over time. One way one can realign incentives between di↵erent
parties to economic exchange and induce cooperative behaviour is by disseminating reputa-
tional information (Greif, 1993). There is evidence that when such information is available,
people will make use of it, discriminating in favor of those with positive reputations. Indeed,
the availability of reputational information has been the cornerstone of the success of online
marketplaces such as eBay (Dellarocas, 2003; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007).
However, the development of decentralized mechanisms that disseminate reputation
information occurred well before the advent of the Internet. It has been suggested that one
such mechanism is gossip, the class of speech that transmits information about the behaviors
and attributes of third parties. By some accounts, gossip is said to account for the majority
of human conversation; this raises the possibility that people’s everyday conversations may
be one of the most important contexts for the transmission of reputational information
(Dunbar et al. 1997). The sheer ubiquity of gossip suggests that it may impact on economic
exchange even in the presence of more formal reputational mechanisms, like those in online
marketplaces. Indeed, word-of-mouth is still widely recognised as a powerful driver of new
business (Trusov et al., 2009). However, there is (at least) one potential limitation to gossip
serving this economic and social function: its inaccuracy. If the reputational information
contained in gossip is inaccurate (through error or deliberate distortion), then recipients are
more likely to make mistakes like choosing to trust an untrustworthy or unproductive partner.
In these situations, people should be less willing to discriminate on the basis of gossip that
they receive. Although there is no behavioural evidence for this claim, simulation work
has shown that as gossip becomes less accurate, discriminating players are less successful
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(Nakamaru and Kawata, 2004; Roberts, 2008; Rauwork et al., 2015).
In this paper, we explore the impact of gossip and its (in)accuracy on trust and trust-
worthiness in a population of individuals playing decentralized, two-player trust games. We
suggest that gossip inaccuracy erodes the cooperative potential of gossip if it interferes with
people’s tendencies to discriminate on the basis of gossip and their partners’ tendencies to
anticipate this discrimination (Basu et al., 2009; Boero et al., 2009; Sperber and Baumard,
2009; Sylwester and Roberts, 2013). If gossip provides accurate information about a poten-
tial partner’s past trustworthiness and competence, recipients are better able to choose to
play with good players and avoid playing with bad players. If people receive inaccurate in-
formation, they are hampered in their ability to discriminate in this way. At the same time,
gossip creates a demand for reputability, as long as targets are aware of the transmission
of gossip, and believe that recipients are likely to act on it. If the accuracy of gossip is in
question, the targets of gossip may infer that the recipients of the piece of gossip are unlikely
to discriminate on the basis of the information it contains. This reduction in reputational
concern is likely to reduce the motivation of the targets of gossip to engage in cooperative
acts.
In each round of our experiment, we randomly match an Investor with an Agent; the
Investor can send any proportion of her endowment to that Agent. Agents can be High-
Productivity or Low-Productivity types: any amount sent to the former type is multiplied
by six, while any amount sent to the latter is multiplied by three. Investors do not know
what type they are facing when deciding how much to send. Agents can then return any
amount they wish to the Investor. Before the round ends, each Investor sends a message
summarizing the events of the current round: (i) the amount the Agent received; (ii) her
type; (iii) the amount the Agent returned to the Investor. At the start of the following
round, and prior to making their sending decision, Investors receive a message pertaining to
the Agent they are matched with.
In a first set of treatments, we explore whether inaccuracy in messages sent between
Investors spontaneously occurs in populations playing our game, and we study what e↵ect
such inaccuracy has on levels of trust and trustworthiness. To achieve this, we generated
di↵erent experimental treatments by varying who Investors sent their messages to and who
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they received them from. In the Gossip treatment, Investors sent their messages to the
Investor who would play with their Agent in the following round. In the Truth treatment,
Investors sent their messages to the experimenter, and received factual summaries of Agent
behavior from the experimental software. In the No Message treatment, Investors neither
sent nor received messages. By comparing behavior in Gossip to behaviour in No Message,
we are able to understand to what extent Investors are willing to discriminate on the basis
of the information they receive. Comparing Gossip to Truth allows us to understand if In-
vestors are more likely to lie when communicating to one another than when communicating
to the experimenter. This comparison also shows to what extent spontaneous message inac-
curacy undermines the ability of Investors to discriminate between Agents and the resulting
willingness of Agents to build positive reputations.
In an additional treatment, we study how exogenous message inaccuracy a↵ects trust
and trustworthiness. This Inaccurate treatment was a variation on the Gossip treatment. As
before, Investors sent their messages to the Investor who would next play with their Agent.
However, in this new treatment there was a 50% chance in a given round that an Investor
would unknowingly receive a message intended for another Investor. Both Investors and
Agents knew of this manipulation, although this was not common knowledge (i.e., Investors
were not told that Agents were also aware of the potential for misdirected gossip and vice
versa). In this treatment, Investors have weaker incentives to discriminate on the basis
of the information they receive; this translates into a weaker incentive for Agents to be
trustworthy. This treatment allows us to understand how high levels of inaccuracy a↵ect
Investors’ reputation-based discrimination and Agents’ reputational concern.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contextualises our paper in the
literature on reputation and gossip. Section outlines the research questions and summarizes
the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 o↵ers
some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
In populations where there is uncertainty about the type of player one is matched with,
players may want to discriminate against those who have past histories of uncooperative
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behavior, and discriminate in favor of those who have reliably cooperated in the past (Wilson,
1985). This means that if reputation-based discrimination is prevalent, strategic reputation
building can be a sensible strategy. In these populations, people may find that the immediate
costs of cooperation are outweighed by the rewards that their positive reputation delivers over
time (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Fudenberg and Levine, 1992).
Indeed, people do appear to be highly sensitive to the possibility that their behaviours may
have reputational consequences, as they cooperate more when they believe that they may be
observed (Haley and Fessler, 2005; Charness et al., 2011; Barclay, 2012; Yoeli et al., 2013).
When actions are not perfectly observable, it is still possible for people to acquire
reputation information through their social networks by means of gossip (Dunbar, 1996,
2004; Foster, 2004; Sommerfeld et al., 2007). Cognitive and evolutionary psychologists have
long argued that gossip may be an important mechanism through which people can resolve
social dilemmas (Wilson et al., 2000; Dunbar, 2004; Willer et al., 2010). Enquist and Liemar
(1993) show that cooperation can be an evolutionary stable strategy if group members can
exchange gossip that conveys reputational information. Indeed, the mere possibility that
others may gossip about them leads to individuals giving more in a one-shot dictator game
(Piazza and Bering, 2008), or contributing more in a one-shot public good game (Beersma
and van Kleef, 2011). In an organizational setting, gossip can allow people to maintain and
regulate their social networks. For instance, employees can engage in gossip in order to
learn about, and influence, the reputations of other organisational members (Emler, 1990,
2001). At an interpersonal level, sharing gossip may also shore up trust between gossipers
— especially where sharing this gossip is risky. For instance, employees who share negative
gossip about high power individuals within the organisation are opening themselves to the
possibility that their audience will report the gossip to the individuals in question (McAndrew
and Milenkovic, 2002). Evidence that making oneself vulnerable in this way may facilitate
trust and cooperation between gossipers is provided by Kopa´nyi-Peuker et al. (2017) who
showed that agents who voluntarily entered into a contract that permitted them to punish
one another if they defected achieved higher rates of cooperation than agents who did not.
Recent work has shown that allowing the exchange of gossip in social dilemma games
can bolster levels of cooperation. For instance, Abraham et al. (2016) found that if players in
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a population playing decentralized trust games were able to exchange objective information
about their transactions at no cost, they were able to sustain higher trust and trustworthi-
ness. When there was a cost to exchanging this information, however, it was less widely
used, and less e↵ective. In the context of public goods games, Wu, Balliet and van Lange
(2015) found that allowing players to exchange gossip increased levels of cooperation, and in-
deed was more e↵ective than punishment at doing so. Finally, Feinberg et al. (2014) showed
that the capacity for gossip to shore up cooperation in a public goods game was especially
pronounced when players were able to discriminate on the basis of the information that it
contained (see also Feinberg et al., 2012). Together, then, this work shows that when people
exchange gossip, and use it in order to discriminate among potential partners, these partners
are more likely to behave cooperatively.
The accuracy of gossip is central to its function as a catalyst of cooperation. As gossip
becomes less accurate, people are less likely to use it to discriminate between partners;
in turn, their partners’ willingness to engage in strategic reputation building could also
diminish. In particular, if people believe that inaccurate gossip reduces reputation-based
discrimination then they may be less concerned about the reputational implications of their
behaviours and less willing to cooperate (Semmann et al., 2004). To date, there is little work
that has examined the e↵ect of inaccuracy in information transmission on cooperation. Most
of the work that has done so has employed agent-based simulation models (Nakamura and
Kawata, 2004; Rauwolf et al., 2015; Roberts, 2008). Importantly, these studies have shown
that increasing the inaccuracy of gossip leads to a decline in cooperation.
The general approach of these studies has been to examine the fitness of cooperators
who discriminate on the basis of the gossip they receive relative to agents who do not.
While these studies found that discriminating gossipers are highly successful when gossip is
perfectly accurate (ensuring high levels of cooperation), this was no longer the case when
inaccuracy is introduced into gossip. In particular, inaccurate gossip increased the success of
defectors playing a prisoner’s dilemma game, especially when this gossip spread widely and
rapidly (Nakamura and Kawata, 2004). In a similar way, inaccurate gossip in an indirect
reciprocity game increased the relative success of defectors (Rauwolf et al., 2015) or players
using a strategy of direct reciprocity (Roberts, 2008).
6
These simulations also provide evidence that the negative e↵ects of inaccuracy can be
seen when rates of inaccuracy are quite low. In particular, Rauwolf et al. (2015) found that
cooperation rates declined dramatically if more than 20 percent of messages misreported
an agent’s previous cooperation as defection, as vice versa. Roberts (2008) found similar
patterns when more than 30 percent of messages were replaced with a random value (in a
population equally composed of cooperators and defectors, this would mean that 15 percent
of messages were wrong). There is also some behavioural support for these findings, as
Pfei↵er et al. (2012) found that allowing people who were playing an infinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game to sell and buy positive reputations between rounds (so reducing
the association between past behaviour and reputation) was associated with substantially
lower levels of cooperation.
While these studies suggest that even small increases in inaccuracy should lead to
reductions in trustworthiness and trust, Nowak et al. (2000) provide a basis for expecting
that even inaccurate information may be better than no information at all. In particular,
these authors report that allowing reputational information to flow through a network of
agents playing the ultimatum game makes it much more likely that players will settle on
the fair strategy of making and accepting high o↵ers than the rational strategy of making
and accepting low o↵ers. The beneficial impact of reputational information was evident even
when when a small fraction of players (i.e., 10-20 percent) in the population learned about
the o↵er that a given agent had previously accepted.Although this study does not examine
inaccurate information, it does suggest that (at least in some circumstances), inaccurate
gossip may be better than no information at all.
To the best of our knowledge, there is almost no empirical work to date looking at the
impact of gossip inaccuracy on behaviour. Furthermore, no paper to date has disentangled
the e↵ect that inaccurate gossip has on the behaviour of those who receive the gossip and
those being gossiped about. The closest related work to the present paper is that by Fehr
and Sutter (2016), who independently of our work, look at the e↵ect of observability by
a third party in a similar vein to that proposed by Feinberg et al. (2012), as well as the
possibility of that third party engaging in gossip as a non-monetary form of punishment in
populations playing trust games. Fehr and Sutter (2016) find that mere observability by a
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third party increases trust and trustworthiness. The ability of that third party to send a free
form message about the events of the game increases trustworthiness further, even when the
message is noisy.
Our study contributes to this literature by exploring how inaccuracy can impact dis-
crimination and reputational concern. These are intrinsically interlinked processes that are
both implicated in the e↵ectiveness of gossip (and reputation systems more generally). That
is, discriminating in favour of cooperative agents increases the likelihood of future coop-
eration (at least when similar discrimination is anticipated). At the same time, however,
in most everyday circumstances, these processes are likely to be loosely coupled, as agents
may assume that levels of discrimination are higher (or lower) than they actually are, and
consequently exhibit more (or less) trustworthiness than is warranted. By examining discrim-
ination and reputation building in the presence of endogenous and exogenous inaccuracy, our
study will inform an understanding of the way in which these processes interact to determine
the e cacy of gossip.
3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In this pre-registered experiment (https://tinyurl.com/hc27ajw), we implemented a modified
version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) in networks of 12 people. Participants played
the game on networked computers that were separated by partitions to ensure anonymity.
At the start of each session, equal numbers of participants were randomly assigned to be
Investors (N=6) or Agents (High-Value N=3; Low-Value N=3), a role they retained for the
duration of the experiment. We used the neutral terminology ‘Sender’ and ‘Receiver’ in the
instructions and experimental software when referring to ‘Investors’ and ‘Agents’. Please see
the Appendix for copies of the instructions.
The di↵erent types of Agents capture the idea that there is a distribution of pro-
ductivity in the economy, which manifests itself in the surplus that is generated when an
Investor enters in an economic relationship with an Agent. By manipulating Agent types
we were able to examine the di↵erent kinds of reputational information exchanged by people
in everyday life. In particular, while previous work has focused exclusively on reputational
information about a person’s morality (i.e., trustworthiness or cooperative behaviour), real
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social networks also convey reputational information about a person’s competence (Peters
and Kashima, 2015).
In each of the 15 experimental rounds, an Investor was randomly paired with an Agent
with the exception that no two individuals could be paired twice in a row (over 80 per cent
of Investors faced High-Value Agents on at least 5, but fewer than 11 rounds). At the start
of each round, Investors received an endowment of 10 Experimental Currency Units (ECU),
and could send any amount (including zero) to their Agent. To proxy the role ability plays in
generating economic benefits, any amount sent to a High-Value Agent was multiplied by 6,
while any amount sent to a Low-Value Agent was multiplied by 3. On receiving their ECU,
Agents could return any amount, including zero, to their Investor. Each player’s behaviour,
the Agent’s type and their respective payo↵s for that round were then summarized onscreen,
bringing the round to a close.
The experiment consisted of four treatments. In our baseline treatment, No Message,
there was no opportunity for Investors to communicate with each other. In all other treat-
ments, we allowed reputational information to flow within networks. In these reputational
treatments, at the end of each round Investors were asked to construct a message that told
the message recipient what they wanted him or her to know about the number of ECU that
they had sent to their Agent, the number their Agent received, the number their Agent
returned and their Agent’s type. Messages about ECU sent, received and returned were nu-
merical in nature: subjects had to type the relevant number in a text box. Messages about
the Agent’s type were selected from a set menu with two options (High- or Low-Value). To
preclude memory e↵ects, the actual behaviour in that round was summarized onscreen for
reference. From the second round onwards, Investors in the reputation treatments received
a message that described their new Agent’s most recent behaviour.
We did not assign any label or identifying information to Investors and/or Agents. It
was therefore impossible for Investors to track the behaviour of di↵erent Agents over time.
Likewise, Agents could not track the past behavior of di↵erent Investors. This also made it
impossible for Investors to track the predictive power of messages from di↵erent Investors
over time. We opted for this environment in order to have the cleanest possible measure of
what the impact of communication between Investors is on cooperation in a population. It
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is impossible for reputational information to be acquired in any form other than through
gossip.
[insert Table 1 here]
We generated di↵erent experimental treatments by varying who Investors sent their
messages to and who they received them from, outlined in Table 1. We ran an initial set
of three treatments, and subsequently collected an additional treatment in which gossip was
exogenously made inaccurate. The initial set consisted of a treatment with information
transmission between Investors, Gossip; a direct observation treatment, Truth; and a no
reputation treatment, No Message. In the Gossip treatment, Investors sent their messages to
the Investor who would play with their Agent in the following round. In the Truth treatment,
Investors sent their messages to the experimenter, and received factual summaries of Agent
behaviour from the experimental software. In the No Message treatment, Investors neither
sent nor received messages.
In a one-shot interaction, self-interested Agents will keep all the ECU they receive.
Investors who anticipate this response should not send any ECU to their Agents. If a
population of randomly matched players repeatedly plays this game, and if reputational
information is available, discrimination and reputation building may come into play, making
it easier for Investors to trust their Agents. If gossip supports these reputational processes,
it should increase social welfare, because the number of ECU that Investors send to Agents
determines joint profits.
Hypothesis 1: Levels of trust and trustworthiness will be higher in Truth and Gossip than
in No Message.
It is noteworthy that in our game, there is no financial incentive for an Investor to
send truthful information about an Agent to the next Investor who will play with that Agent.
While there is no financial incentive associated with Investors sending inaccurate messages
either, they are free to do so if they want to. We anticipate that Investors will be more likely
to send inaccurate messages in Gossip, where these messages are passed on to other players,
than in Truth, where they are passed on to the Experimenters. If Investors are inaccurate
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in the messages that they send to one another, or believe that such inaccuracy is possible,
then this should reduce their willingness to discriminate on the basis of gossip. This should,
in turn, reduce the reputational concern and trustworthiness of Agents. Investors as a result
should be less trusting.
Hypothesis 2: Investors will send more inaccurate messages in Gossip than in Truth.
Hypothesis 3: Levels of trust and trustworthiness in will be higher in Truth than in Gossip.
We complemented this initial set of treatments with a fourth treatment, Inaccurate.
As in Gossip, Investors sent their messages to the Investor who would next play with their
Agent. However, in this new treatment there was a 50% chance in a given round that an
Investor would unknowingly receive a message intended for another Investor. Both Investors
and Agents knew of this manipulation although this was not common knowledge (i.e., In-
vestors were not told that Agents were aware of the potential for misdirected gossip and vice
versa).
The built-in inaccuracy in the Inaccurate treatment should compound any sponta-
neous inaccuracy inherent to communication in the Gossip treatment, and have a dramatic
e↵ect on the reliability of the information being transmitted between Investors. This should
have a knock-on e↵ect on trust and trustworthiness.
Hypothesis 4: Levels of trust and trustworthiness will be higher in Gossip than in Inaccu-
rate.
We recruited 288 participants in March and October 2015 from a pool of volunteer
participants through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We conducted a total of 24 sessions, six for
each of the four treatments. A total of 72 participants took part in each treatment. Each
participant took part in only one treatment, and no participant had taken part in any trust
experiments previously run in the same lab. Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants sat
in an individual booth, which had partitions to minimize visual contact between neighboring
participants. The instructions requested that participants maintained silence at all times. All
interactions were done through computer terminals, using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
1997). The experiment was run in the FEELE laboratory at the University of Exeter. The
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average duration of the experiment was one hour. The experimental payment was calculated
on the basis of the show-up fee plus their payo↵ from one randomly selected experimental
round. The average payment was approximately £11.90 (US$18.90).
4 Results
4.1 Message (In)accuracy
There was a considerable degree of spontaneous inaccuracy in the messages that were sent by
Investors in the reputation treatments: 53 per cent of Investors sent one or more inaccurate
messages, such that about 20 per cent of all messages had at least one inaccurate component.
Notably, this approaches the levels of inaccuracy that have been shown to undermine the
cooperative potential of gossip in simulation studies (Roberts, 2008; Rauwolf et al., 2015).
This inaccuracy was more often seen in reports of an Agent’s trustworthiness (ECU returned:
15 per cent of messages) than his or her type (5 per cent) or Investors’ self-reported trust
(ECU sent: 8 per cent of messages). This inaccuracy was also significantly more prevalent
when Investors were writing to one another (Gossip and Inaccurate treatments: 11 to 12 per
cent of the three message components) than when they were writing to the experimenter
(Truth treatment: 4 per cent of the three message components). The fact that rates of
inaccuracy were about three times higher when communicating with other Investors (vs. the
Experimenter), suggests that experimental demand e↵ects and/or random imprecision are
unlikely to be their only —or indeed the most important— determining factors.
Evidence that the observed inaccuracy was driven by strategic considerations is pro-
vided by an examination of Investors’ responses to an open question in the post-session
questionnaire that asked how they had arrived at their experimental decisions. In their re-
sponses, 49 per cent of Investors in the reputation treatments made some reference to the
accuracy of messages. In the Truth treatment, 70 per cent of such Investors stated that they
always told the truth and another 23 per cent said that they lied at least occasionally. In the
Gossip treatment, the pattern was reversed, with 32 per cent of such Investors saying that
they always told the truth and 63 per cent admitting having lied. In the Inaccurate treat-
ment, there was a di↵erent pattern again, with 85 per cent of these Investors commenting
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instead on the inaccuracy of the messages they received.
[insert Figure 1 here]
Importantly, Investors who admitted lying always specified how this helped them to
achieve one or more social ends. In particular, 53 per cent said they exaggerated negatives
to punish untrustworthy Agents, 26 per cent said they exaggerated positives to reward
trustworthy Agents, 16 per cent said they misrepresented Agent behaviour to compete with
other Investors and 21 per cent said they put a positive spin on all behaviour to encourage
other Investors to send more — perhaps indicating e ciency concerns (Engelmann and
Strobel, 2004). While the contradictory form of these di↵erent lies will tend to obscure
general patterns of inaccuracy in the data, there is some evidence for the punishment motive
in the data. Figure 1 plots the relative frequency of lies as a function of the trustworthiness of
the Agent (i.e. the amount returned by the Agent as a proportion of what she received) in the
Gossip and Inaccurate treatments. Negative lies (i.e. messages portraying the Agent as less
trustworthy than reality) account for 31% of all messages when the Agent returned no more
than 10% of what she received. Thereafter, the relative frequency of negative lies is between
10-15%, a significant decrease (all comparisons  2(1)   4.89, p  0.027). In contrast, the
proportion of positive lies (i.e. messages that portray the Agent as more trustworthy than
reality) do not vary with the Agent’s actual trustworthiness.
Observation 1: There was a substantial amount of inaccuracy in messages sent by Investors;
the primary motivation for message inaccuracy was the punishment of misbehaving Agents.
In short, these findings are consistent with claims that inaccuracy is intrinsic to gossip;
they also suggest that this is due, at least in part, to gossipers’ perceptions that lying can
serve a range of social functions. We will now examine the implications of this inaccuracy
for the cooperative functions of gossip.
4.2 Spontaneous Inaccuracy and Cooperation
[insert Figure 2 here]
To see whether spontaneous inaccuracy eroded the ability of reputational information
to shore up cooperation, we compared Investor trust behaviour in the Gossip, Truth and No
13
Message treatments, pooling the data in five-round blocks (all our findings replicate if we
analyse behaviour round-by-round; see Table C3 in the Appendix). Trust levels are presented
in Figure 2.1 Although there were no di↵erences in Investors’ trust levels across the three
treatments in the first third of the experiment (all comparisons F (1, 29)  2.33, p   0.140),
di↵erences emerged over time. By the last third of the experiment, levels of trust were
significantly higher in the Truth and Gossip treatments than they were in the No Message
treatment (all comparisons F (1, 35)   9.24, p  0.006). Unexpectedly, there was no evidence
that the ability of reputational information to boost trust depended on whether it was
conveyed through gossip or direct observation (all comparisons F (1, 35)  0.07, p   0.800).
This suggests that reputational information can be less than perfectly accurate and still
function very well.
Observation 2: The ability to transmit reputational information about Agents leads to
higher levels of trust, even when messages may be inaccurate.
To understand why inaccuracy in the Gossip treatment did not interfere with its
ability to shore up cooperation, we looked at the way in which it a↵ected key reputational
processes. We first examined Investors’ tendencies to discriminate between Agents on the
basis of the messages that they received in the Truth and Gossip treatments. The average
amount of trust shown by Investors as a function of gossip about the Agent’s trustworthiness
and Type is shown in Figures 3 and 4. As expected, Investors discriminate between Agents as
a function of the Agent’s trustworthiness (sending more points to reputedly more trustworthy
Agents), and the tendency to discriminate on this basis appears to be higher in the Truth than
the Gossip treatment. Investors in Truth and Gossip also discriminated positively towards
reputedly High Type Agents; interestingly, this e↵ect appears to be more pronounced in
Gossip.
[insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
Table 2 presents the output of the three-level random e↵ects maximum likelihood
1We present summary statistics results in graphical form for ease of exposition. The regression results
on which Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are based can be found in Appendix Tables C4, C8, C7, C4 and C6
respectively.
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estimation regressing ECU sent by Investor j in round t in session k on the content of the
message received by that Investor (Agent type and proportion ECU returned, which we
calculated by dividing ECU returned by ECU received), the interaction between Agent type
and proportion ECU returned, as well as a linear time trend and its interactions with the
message variables. All these variables were interacted with treatment dummies.
[insert Table 2 here]
The first two columns in Table 2 show that in the Truth and Gossip treatments
Investors trusted Agents more if the message said that the Agent had previously been more
trustworthy (i.e., returned a higher proportion of received ECU). Importantly though, this
tendency to discriminate on the basis of previous trustworthiness was about two and a half
times higher in the Truth treatment than it was in the Gossip treatment ( 2(1) = 5.06, p =
0.025). This is consistent with the possibility that Investors were less willing to discriminate
between Agents on the basis of potentially inaccurate reputational information. At the same
time, the significant positive interaction between Agent trustworthiness and experimental
round in the Gossip treatment ( 2(1) = 6.93, p = 0.009) suggests that over time Investors
learned to rely on these messages.
Interestingly, the analysis represented in Table 2 reveals that Investors in the Gossip
treatment were sensitive to their Agent’s Type, as they sent significantly more points to
High-Type Agents. However, there is no statistically significant di↵erence in the di↵erential
treatment of di↵erent types of Agents when we compared Truth to Gossip ( 2(1) = 0.19, p =
0.666); the lack of statistical significance is presumably due to the large variance in the esti-
mate for the Truth condition. There was no evidence that Investors in the Gossip treatment
learned that Type was more likely to be accurate, as the interaction with experimental round
was not significant. In addition, there was no evidence of a similar increase in sensitivity in
the Inaccurate treatment.
Observation 3: Message inaccuracy leads to Investors discriminating less on the basis of
gossip they receive about Agent trustworthiness.
To understand whether the unconditional trust shown by Investors in the Gossip
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treatment was a reflection of the trustworthiness of their Agents, we compared the propor-
tion of ECU returned by Agents in the three conditions (Figure 5). By this measure, Agents
in the Truth and Gossip treatments were about twice as trustworthy as those in the No Mes-
sage treatment in all three five-round blocks (all comparisons F (1, 35)   18.22, p  0.001).
Therefore, the transmission of reputational information appeared to motivate strategic rep-
utation building. Importantly though, there was no evidence that Agents in the Gossip
treatment were any less trustworthy than those in the Truth treatment at any stage in the
experiment (all comparisons F (1, 35)  1.06, p   0.314). This means that Agents in the
Gossip treatment might not have been able to anticipate their Investors’ weaker discrimina-
tion at the start of the experiment, nor to take advantage of it as the experiment progressed
(at least over the time frame examined here).
Observation 4: Trustworthiness rates are higher in Gossip and Truth than No Message,
which indicates that transmission of reputational information appeared to motivate strategic
reputation building.
[insert Figure 5 here]
Our data suggest that inaccurate gossip does a better job of shoring up trust in
behavioural settings than simulation work implies. We are also able to explain why: Investors
were sensitive to the manner in which reputational information was conveyed, as their rate of
trust was less responsive to information about past trustworthiness in Gossip than in Truth.
However, Agents were as trustworthy in Gossip as in Truth; this may have led Investors to
be more trusting unconditionally in the former than in the latter.
To see whether Agents can better calibrate their trustworthiness to Investors’ actual
discrimination when levels of observed inaccuracy were higher, in the next section we examine
behaviour in the Inaccurate treatment, where there was a 50 per cent chance of a message
being misdirected.
4.3 Misdirected Messages and Cooperation
The messages that Investors received in the Inaccurate treatment were highly inaccurate, as
they only accounted for, on average, 7 to 12 per cent of variance in the behaviors that they
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were supposed to describe. For instance, the behaviour-to-message correlation for ECU sent
was r = 0.35 in the Inaccurate treatment; the same association was r = 0.80 in the Gossip
treatment.2 Further analysis (see Table ?? in Appendix) showed that the information that
Investors received was significantly less accurate in the Inaccurate treatment than in the
Gossip treatment across all message components (all comparisons,  2(1)   69.50, p < .001).
To see whether this increased inaccuracy reduced the e↵ectiveness of gossip, we com-
pared Investor trust in the Inaccurate treatment with the Gossip and No Message treatments
(Figure 2). There was no evidence of treatment di↵erences in the first third of the exper-
iment (all F (1, 29)  1.55, p   0.226). However, from this point onwards, levels of trust
in the Inaccurate treatment dropped below those in the Gossip treatment (all comparisons
F (1, 29)   5.20, p  0.032) and could not be distinguished from those in the No Message
treatment (all comparisons F (1, 29)  2.71, p   0.113). Together, these findings lead to our
next observation.
Observation 5: Exogenously increasing the inaccuracy of gossip had a deleterious e↵ect on
trust.
To better understand these findings, we return to the key reputation processes. Fig-
ure 4 shows that Investors seem to be less willing to discriminate between Agents as a
function of the Agent’s trustworthiness in the Inaccurate treatment, Figure 3 shows that
Investors in Inaccurate do not appear to discriminate between Agents on the basis of their
reputed Type. The last column of Table 2 shows that Investors in the Inaccurate treatment
discriminated in favour of Agents who were reputed to be more trustworthy. At intercept,
Investors in the Inaccurate treatment were no less willing to discriminate on the basis of
Agent trustworthiness than were those in the Gossip treatment ( 2(1)  0.04, p   0.841).
Importantly however, unlike Investors in the Gossip treatment, there was no evidence that
Investors in the Inaccurate treatment increased their reliance on these messages over time
( 2(1) = 5.01, p = 0.025).
Observation 6: Exogenously increasing the inaccuracy of gossip leads to Investors (i)
2For a full set of correlations between behavior and messages, see Table ?? in the Appendix
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reducing their levels of trust and (ii) maintaining their reduced reliance on gossip information
over time, relative to the Truth and Gossip conditions.
Next, we compared the trustworthiness of Agents in the Inaccurate, Gossip and No
Message treatments (Figure 5). Agents in the Inaccurate treatment appeared to anticipate
diminished discrimination: in the first third of the experiment they returned significantly
less than Agents in the Gossip treatment (F (1, 29) = 28.18, p < 0.001). This relatively low
level of trustworthiness was retained through the remainder of the experiment (F (1, 29)  
8.23, p  0.009). At the same time, however, Agents in the Inaccurate treatment were
consistently more trustworthy than those in the No Message treatment (all comparisons
F (1, 29)   5.38, p  0.030).
Observation 7: Exogenously increasing inaccuracy in gossip diminishes strategic reputation
building and trustworthiness.
4.4 Investor Responsiveness to Messages
We next look at how Investors reacted to the messages they received at the start of each
round, and the resulting payo↵ consequences. Tables B1, B2, and B3 in the Appendix display
the average profit that each available action (i.e. ECU sent) yielded an Investor conditional
on the message they received from another Investor concerning the trustworthiness of the
Agent they were about to play with. In order to make the analysis tractable, we constructed a
composite message that condensed the three pieces of information being transmitted (ECU
sent, Agent type and ECU returned) into one metric: the percentage amount returned
by the Agent, which we define as the ratio of ECU returned to ECU received (i.e. post-
multiplication, and thus controlling for Agent type). We conditioned the profitability of
di↵erent actions on five sets of messages: 0; (0, 0.2]; (0.2, 0.4]; (0.4; 0.6]; (0.6, 1].3 We took
this approach in order to overcome two obstacles: the dimensionality of message space, and
sample size. Constructing the composite message and pooling messages in five sets allowed us
to have enough observations across outcomes to make meaningful statistical inference about
what action was most profitable to Investors for a given message. We focus our analysis on
3We excluded three observations where Investors reported return rates greater than 1, which are impos-
sible.
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instances with at least six observations, and we test for significant di↵erences in profits using
non-parametric statistics.4
We start by focusing on the cases where the message either reported the Agent not
having returned anything (i.e. {0}) or less than 20% of the amount he or she received. In all
three treatments, the average profit does not noticeably change with ECU sent, and there are
no instances in any of the three treatments where Investors made higher profits by sending
positive amounts than by sending 0 ECU. When the message sent to the Investor reported
that the Agent returned more than 20% of the amount received, there is a clear di↵erence
between the Innacurate treatment and the Truth and Gossip treatments. In the latter
treatments, average profit dramatically increases with ECU sent, and the most profitable
action is 9 ECU or 10 ECU (between 80% and 100% more profitable than sending 0 ECU). In
contrast, in the Inaccurate treatment, the increase in average profit is much more moderate;
the most profitable action yielded 50% higher payo↵s than sending nothing.
As a consequence, the distribution of ECU sent conditional on the message type in
Inaccurate is much more dispersed than in Truth and Gossip. In latter two treatments, there
is a clear modal amount sent conditional on message: 0 for low reported trustworthiness
and 10 for high reported trustworthiness. In Inaccurate, this is only the case when the
message reports a % return in the 0.4-1 range. This is corroborated by Figure 4, which plots
average ECU sent conditional on the message about the percentage amount returned by
Agents. The average amount sent conditional on a message of no-trustworthiness is actually
higher in Inaccurate than in Gossip (F (1, 16) = 5.60, p = 0.030) or Truth (F (1, 16) =
11.64, p = 0.003), which reflects the higher dispersion in ECU sent conditional on a message
of {0} (see tables B1, B2, and B3). For messages reporting low trustworthiness, (0, 0.2] and
(0.2, 0.4], we find no di↵erence in average ECU sent when comparing Inaccurate to Gossip
(F (1, 16) = 0.53, p = 0.478; F (1, 16) = 0.79, p = 0.387) or Truth (F (1, 16) = 0.34, p = 0.570;
F (1, 16) = 0.19, p = 0.672). However, for messages conveying high trustworthiness (0.4, 1],
the average ECU sent in Inaccurate was significantly smaller than that in Gossip (F (1, 16) =
3.54, p = 0.0.077) and Truth (F (1, 16) = 10.24, p = 0.005).
4We nevertheless had to pool observations across sessions, as well as ignoring the time dimension in the
experiment.
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Observation 8: In both Gossip and Truth treatments, responding to (low) high reported
trustworthiness with (low) high trust yields significantly higher payo↵s than any other strat-
egy. This association is substantially less evident in the Inaccurate treatment.
4.5 E ciency
We conclude by looking at the impact gossip had on e ciency, defined as the joint payo↵s
for players in the population. The left panel in Figure 6 displays the average total payo↵
in each treatment, as well as the share of Investors and Agents. Allowing for information
transmission leads to a significant increase in e ciency, irrespective of the origin or reliability
of the message, relative to the case where no information is transmitted (Inaccurate = No
Message, F (1, 23) = 3.18, p = 0.088; all other comparisons with No Message, F (1, 23)  
8.08, p < 0.001). Average total payo↵s are lower in Inaccurate than Gossip (F (1, 23) =
8.66, p = 0.007) but not significantly di↵erent than in the Truth condition (F (1, 23) =
2.48, p = 0.129).
The right panel in Figure 6 breaks down the di↵erences in average payo↵s by role
(i.e. Investor, Low-Type Agent and High-Type Agent). It is immediately apparent that
the bulk of the gains in e ciency in Gossip and Truth relative to No Message are borne
by Investors (both comparisons, F (1, 23)   22.98, p  0.001), as well as High Value Agents
(both comparisons, F (1, 23)   4.39, p  0.047), who turn out to be the beneficiaries from the
Investors’ ability to discriminate on the basis of reputation. In contrast, Low-Value Agents
do not gain from the existence of gossip between Investors relative to the No Message baseline
(F (1, 29) = 2.71, p = 0.114). Low-Value Agents do benefit from exogenous noise: they earn
significantly more in the Inaccurate treatment than in Gossip (F (1, 29) = 4.46, p = 0.046).
[insert Figure 6 here]
Observation 9: Gossip leads to increased e ciency, primarily by increasing average In-
vestor and High-Value Agent payo↵s. Exogenous inaccuracy in messages benefits Low-Value
Agents.
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5 Conclusion
It has been suggested that inaccuracy poses a major threat to the capacity of gossip to
boost cooperation in society. Our results suggest that while inaccuracy is intrinsic to gossip
—most Investors misrepresented their Agent’s behaviour at least once— and perceived to
serve a range of strategic purposes, it may be less of a threat to its functionality than
previous simulation work suggests. Even though spontaneous inaccuracy in messages was
widespread, meaning that gossip provided a weak reflection of Agent behaviour, rates of
trust and trustworthiness were higher than when there was no transmission of reputational
information at all. As a result, even inaccurate gossip had a positive impact on welfare:
total earnings were higher when gossip was allowed than when it was not. Investors were
the main beneficiaries, with an increase in earnings of up to 50% relative to the No Message
condition.
Our finding that inaccurate gossip is less e↵ective than accurate gossip, but more
e↵ective than no gossip is consistent with that reported by Fehr and Sutter (2016). The fact
that this consistency is observed in the context of non-trivial methodological di↵erences—
including levels of inaccuracy, gossiper role and message forms—points to the likely robust-
ness of the findings. Specifically, across the two papers, it seems that inaccurate gossip is
more e↵ective than no gossip whether it is misdirected on 20% or 50% of occasions; the
capacity of gossip to increase e ciency does not appear to depend on whether the gossiper
merely observed the described behaviour or was materially a↵ected by it; and the impact
of gossip does not appear to depend on whether the gossip is strictly numerical or allows
free-form verbal messages.
Our analysis further suggests that the e ciency gains that are associated with inac-
curate gossip can be attributed to the fact that it enables its recipients to discriminate on
the basis of the social information they receive and creates a need for reputability among its
targets. Importantly, this is the case even when extreme levels of inaccuracy reduce levels
of discrimination; this suggests that the capacity for gossip to shore up cooperation is likely
to depend as much on the reputational concern it generates as on people’s tendencies to act
on it. As long as people underestimate the way in which inaccuracy diminishes the discrim-
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inatory behavior of gossipers, then the mere existence of gossip (however accurate) should
su ce.
An additional plausible explanation for the e↵ectiveness of gossip in the Inaccurate
treatment is that while gossip may not have been informative about the individual with whom
Investors were about to play, it still provided valuable information about the trustworthiness
of the population of Agents as a whole. Although this reflects a particularity of the current
experimental design, it does have real life analogies. For instance, in a situation of mistaken
identity, an individual could receive information about an actual behaviour but attribute it
to the wrong person. While this could lead to discrimination mistakes, it could also improve
this individual’s understanding of the local descriptive norms (e.g., people can be highly
(un)trustworthy), allowing them to adapt their behavior accordingly.
It is also important to note that in the present experimental setup, Agents could
be excluded from future transactions at a relatively low cost to Investors. Specifically,
Investors could avoid interacting with an Agent by sending them zero ECU (thus keeping
their endowment) if they wished to. It is possible that inaccurate gossip may be less e↵ective
if Investors cannot avoid interacting with Agents (e.g., Feinberg, Willer, and Schultz, 2014).
Our study suggests that online platforms may benefit from imperfect reputation sys-
tems, at least as long as this system serves to increase levels of reputational concern (and
consequently boost levels of cooperation). There is, however, an important di↵erence be-
tween the inaccuracy that we introduced in the lab and that accompanying most online
reputation systems. While the gossip target did not observe specific instances of inaccuracy
in our study (and hence was unable to challenge them), in many online marketplaces feed-
back is visible to both parties and can be countered. It is an open question as to the impact
that these di↵erences would have for the generalizability of the findings that we describe in
our study; we believe that this question is worthy of future research attention.
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Tables
Treatment No Message Truth Gossip Inaccurate
# sessions, # subjects 6, 72 6, 72 6, 72 6, 72
Table 1: Experimental Design
DV: ECU Sent Truth Gossip Inaccurate
Message High-Value Type 0.531 1.743⇤⇤⇤ -0.225
(0.716) (0.666) (0.606)
Message Proportion Returned 8.150⇤⇤⇤ 2.769⇤ 3.179⇤⇤⇤
(1.726) (1.656) (1.190)
Message High-Value Type ⇥ 1.544 1.675 2.311⇤⇤
Proportion Returned (1.451) (1.230) (0.934)
Experimental Round 0.020 0.014 0.023
(0.073) (0.069) (0.057)
Message High-Value Type ⇥ 0.002 -0.034 -0.024
Experimental Round (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
Message Proportion Returned ⇥ 0.317⇤ 0.448⇤⇤⇤ -0.012
Experimental Round (0.177) (0.170) (0.115)
Constant 2.246⇤⇤⇤ 3.097⇤⇤⇤ 4.512⇤⇤⇤
(0.751) (0.733) (0.635)
Random E↵ects Parameters
Session parameter: (< 0.001)
Investor, intercept parameter: (1.649)
Investor, residual: (2.431)
N (obs, Investors)= (1,394, 108); Wald  2(20) = 677.00, p < 0.0001.
⇤⇤⇤ : p < 0.01; ⇤⇤ : p < 0.05; ⇤ : p < 0.10. Coe cients refer to
interactions of IVs in the first column with treatment dummy IVs in first row.
Table 2: Regression estimates of message determinants of Investor trust.
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Figure 1: Proportion of negative and positive lies about trustworthiness as a function of
actual trustworthiness. Error lines represent robust standard errors clustered at the network
level around the mean.
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Figure 2: Trust as measured by ECU sent to Agents. Error lines represent robust standard
errors clustered at the network level around the mean.
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Appendix A: Instruction sets
In this section of the Appendix we reproduce the instructions presented to participants.
Within a given treatment, instructions for di↵erent roles only di↵ered in the first page for
all treatments.
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Instruction Set (No Message – Sender) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Sender. You will retain this role throughout the session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
 
Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
  
Instruction Set (No Message – Receiver) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Receiver. There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type 
Receivers. Your type will be allocated randomly by the computer. You will find out what 
type you are when the experiment starts. You will retain this role and type throughout the 
session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
 
 
Instruction Set (Truth – Sender) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Sender. You will retain this role throughout the session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
 
Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
End of Round Sender Decision.  
At the end of each round, Senders are asked to state to the experimenter what happened in 
the previous round: that is, the amount they sent, the type of Receiver they were matched 
with and the amount sent back by that Receiver. 
 
Round 2 onwards.  
From the start of Round 2 onwards, we will also inform each Sender about what type of 
Receiver they have been paired with for that round (i.e. High or Low). We will also inform 
each Sender about the receiver’s decision in the previous round (i.e., the amount that they 
received, and the amount they chose to send back).  
  
Instruction Set (Truth – Receiver) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Receiver. There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type 
Receivers. Your type will be allocated randomly by the computer. You will find out what 
type you are when the experiment starts. You will retain this role and type throughout the 
session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
End of Round Sender Decision.  
At the end of each round, Senders are asked to state to the experimenter what happened in 
the previous round: that is, the amount they sent, the type of Receiver they were matched 
with and the amount sent back by that Receiver. 
 
Round 2 onwards.  
From the start of Round 2 onwards, we will also inform each Sender about what type of 
Receiver they have been paired with for that round (i.e. High or Low). We will also inform 
each Sender about the receiver’s decision in the previous round (i.e., the amount that they 
received, and the amount they chose to send back).  
 
 
Instruction Set (Gossip – Sender) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Sender. You will retain this role throughout the session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
 
Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
End of Round Sender Decision.  
At the end of each round, Senders are asked to state to the next Sender who will play with 
the Receiver they played with in that round what happened in the previous round: that is, 
the amount they sent, the type of Receiver they were matched with and the amount sent 
back by that Receiver. 
 
Round 2 onwards.  
From the start of Round 2 onwards, Senders will receive a message from the Sender who 
played with their current match in the previous round, which was produced at the end of 
the round. The message will contain information about the type of Receiver they have been 
paired with for that round (i.e. High or Low), and the Receiver’s decision in the previous 
round (i.e., the amount that they received, and the amount they chose to send back).  
  
Instruction Set (Gossip – Receiver) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Receiver. There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type 
Receivers. Your type will be allocated randomly by the computer. You will find out what 
type you are when the experiment starts. You will retain this role and type throughout the 
session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
End of Round Sender Decision.  
At the end of each round, Senders are asked to state to the next Sender who will play with 
the Receiver they played with in that round what happened in the previous round: that is, 
the amount they sent, the type of Receiver they were matched with and the amount sent 
back by that Receiver. 
 
Round 2 onwards.  
From the start of Round 2 onwards, Senders will receive a message from the Sender who 
played with their current match in the previous round, which was produced at the end of 
the round. The message will contain information about the type of Receiver they have been 
paired with for that round (i.e. High or Low), and the Receiver’s decision in the previous 
round (i.e., the amount that they received, and the amount they chose to send back).  
 
 
Instruction Set (Inaccurate - Sender) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Sender. You will retain this role throughout the session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
 
Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
End of Round Sender Decision.  
At the end of each round, Senders are asked to state to the next Sender who will play with 
the Receiver they played with in that round what happened in the previous round: that is, 
the amount they sent, the type of Receiver they were matched with and the amount sent 
back by that Receiver. 
 
Round 2 onwards.  
From the start of Round 2 onwards, Senders will receive a message stating the type of 
Receiver they have been paired with for that round (i.e., High or Low), and the Receiver’s 
decision in the previous round (i.e., the amount that they received, and the amount they 
chose to send back). 
 
Before the message is received, the computer will flip a coin: if heads comes up, the message 
a Sender receives will be exactly that which was sent by the previous Sender; if tails come 
up, the message will instead be about another Receiver’s previous behaviour. You will not 
know whether the computer flipped heads or tails.  
Instruction Set (Inaccurate – Receiver) 
 
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment from 
taking part in this experiment will depend on the decisions you and other people in the 
room take. It is important therefore that you have a good understanding of the rules of the 
experiment. 
 
Payoffs in the experiment are denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 3 ECU 
are worth £1. At the end of the experiment, we will select one round at random and 
convert your payoff in that round to pounds and pay you in cash. You will additionally 
receive your £5 show up fee.  
 
In the experiment there are two different players: Senders and Receivers. Your role is that 
of a Receiver. There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type 
Receivers. Your type will be allocated randomly by the computer. You will find out what 
type you are when the experiment starts. You will retain this role and type throughout the 
session. 
 
You will play a number of rounds in the experiment. At the beginning of every round, we 
will randomly pair a Sender and a Receiver, who will play together for that round. This 
matching will be done in such a way that you will never be paired with the same person in 
two consecutive rounds. Each round consists of a sender decision and a receiver decision.  
 
Sender Decision.  
Each Sender starts each round with 10 ECU and must decide how much of that amount to 
send to the Receiver with whom he/she is playing. This could be any whole number between 
0 and 10.  
 
There are two kinds of Receivers: High-Type and Low-Type Receivers.  
Each ECU a Sender sends to a High-Type Receiver is multiplied by 6. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 48 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 
Each ECU a Sender sends to a Low-Type Receiver is multiplied by 3. 
• For instance if a Sender sends 4 ECU, the Receiver will get 12 ECU. 
• Alternatively, if a Sender sends 8 ECU, the Receiver will get 24 ECU. 
• If however, a Sender sends 0 ECU, the Receiver will get 0 ECU. 
 Receiver Decision.  
Once the Receiver learns how much money he or she has received from the sender, he or 
she has to decide how much money to return to the Sender. The Receiver can return any 
amount he or she wants, from 0 to the maximum amount possible (that is the total amount 
received from the sender). The only restriction is that this amount is in whole numbers 
(i.e., 1, 2, 3 etc). Any money that the receiver does not return he or she gets to keep. 
 
Payoff for Round.  
Once the Sender receives whatever ECUs the Receiver chose to return, the round is over.   
 
• The Sender’s payoff for the round = [10 – amount sent to receiver] + [amount 
returned by receiver]. 
 
• The receiver’s payoff for the round = amount received – amount returned.  
 
End of Round Sender Decision.  
At the end of each round, Senders are asked to state to the next Sender who will play with 
the Receiver they played with in that round what happened in the previous round: that is, 
the amount they sent, the type of Receiver they were matched with and the amount sent 
back by that Receiver. 
 
Round 2 onwards.  
From the start of Round 2 onwards, Senders will receive a message stating the type of 
Receiver they have been paired with for that round (i.e., High or Low), and the Receiver’s 
decision in the previous round (i.e., the amount that they received, and the amount they 
chose to send back). 
 
Before the message is received, the computer will flip a coin: if heads comes up, the message 
a Sender receives will be exactly that which was sent by the previous Sender; if tails come 
up, the message will instead be about another Receiver’s previous behaviour. The Sender 
will not know whether the computer flipped heads or tails. 
 
Appendix B: Supplementary Tables
Message about % returned by Agent
{0} (0, 0.2] (0.2, 0.4] (0.4, 1]
ECU Sender N Sender N Sender N Sender N
Sent Payo↵ Payo↵ Payo↵ Payo↵
0 10.00⇤ 25 10.00⇤ 14 10.00 11 10.00 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1 9.00 2 9.50 2 10.00 1 0
(0.00) (0.71) (0.00)
2 8.67 3 9.40 5 9.67 3 10.00 1
(1.15) (1.67) (1.53) (0.00)
3 - 0 9.00⇤ 8 9.33 9 10.00 5
(2.27) (1.66) (2.24)
4 8.25 4 10.33 3 10.83 12 12.00 10
(4.50) (4.16) (3.64) (3.74)
5 - 0 12.40 5 12.91 11 15.60 5
(5.37) (3.67) (2.51)
6 6 1 10.25 4 14.14 7 14.07 14
(0.00) (0.50) (4.26) (3.97)
7 - 0 15.00 3 13.42 12 15.43 14
(7.21) (5.25) (4.55)
8 6.00 1 14.33 3 12.31 16 16.77 22
(0.00) (5.13) (5.46) (6.56)
9 - 0 5.00 1 21.00⇤ 8 19.14 21
(0.00) (5.73) (6.39)
10 8.00 5 11.00 5 20.27⇤ 26 21.32⇤ 143
(7.58) (6.52) (7.79) (7.89)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
⇤: (joint) maximum profit conditional on message for cases with at least 6 obs.
Table B1: Average Profit conditional on ECU sent and message concerning % of amount
returned by Receiver in previous round, Truth treatment.
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Message about % returned by Agent
{0} (0, 0.2] (0.2, 0.4] (0.4, 1]
ECU Sender N Sender N Sender N Sender N
Sent Payo↵ Payo↵ Payo↵ Payo↵
0 10.00⇤ 16 10.00 24 10.00 12 10.00 8
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1 10.67 3 10.50 2 9.75 4 9.00 1
(1.53) (2.12) (1.50) (0.00)
2 10.00 2 9.25 4 9.75 8 8.00 1
(1.41) (0.50) (1.50) (0.00)
3 13.00 3 8.80 5 9.91 11 11.00 2
(0.00) (1.10) (2.51) (1.41)
4 10.50 2 11.13⇤ 8 11.17 12 10.77 13
(2.12) (6.31) (2.76) (1.74)
5 0 10.00 9 11.67 18 11.92 12
(2.60) (2.20) (3.53)
6 8.33 3 13.00 3 12.00 13 12.94 16
(2.08) (4.58) (3.43) (4.09)
7 0 15.00 3 16.67⇤ 6 15.69 13
(6.08) (2.42) (4.59)
8 13.00 1 11.50 2 16.07 14 19.11 19
(0.00) (3.54) (3.81) (5.88)
9 27.00 1 0 16.44⇤ 9 20.13 15
(0.00) (8.79) (5.85)
10 9.71⇤ 7 13.60⇤ 10 18.83⇤ 53 22.07⇤ 98
(5.56) (7.29) (6.70) (9.30)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
⇤: (joint) maximum profit conditional on message for cases with at least 6 obs.
Table B2: Average Profit conditional on ECU sent and message concerning % of amount
returned by Receiver in previous round, Gossip treatment.
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Message about % returned by Agent
{0} (0, 0.2] (0.2, 0.4] (0.4, 1]
ECU Sender N Sender N Sender N Sender N
Sent Payo↵ Payo↵ Payo↵ Payo↵
0 10⇤ 20 10.00⇤ 7 10.00 5 10.00⇤ 6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1 9.77⇤ 22 10.00 5 10.00 5 10.00 1
(1.11) (1.22) (1.22) (0.00)
2 9.55⇤ 11 8.86⇤ 7 9.25 4 8.00 2
(1.97) (1.46) (0.96) (0.00)
3 8.64⇤ 11 11.00 4 9.50⇤ 10 9.88⇤ 8
(2.69) (4.69) (2.59) (3.27)
4 11.16⇤ 19 10.30⇤ 10 12.00⇤ 22 11.31⇤ 16
(4.21) (3.47) (3.61) (2.55)
5 8.25 4 15.20 5 11.00⇤ 12 10.94⇤ 18
(4.72) (3.03) (5.83) (4.53)
6 11.14⇤ 7 9.86⇤ 7 12.93⇤ 15 11.85⇤ 13
(7.97) (3.24) (3.56) (5.54)
7 12.92⇤ 12 9.50 4 13.56⇤ 18 12.76⇤ 25
(8.56) (4.51) (7.16) (6.68)
8 14.25 4 12.50 2 15.67⇤ 6 12.89⇤ 9
(12.47) (6.36) (17.81) (7.83)
9 4.00 1 13.00 3 9.40 5
(0.00) (6.56) (5.50)
10 6.62 29 15.00 5 12.07⇤ 29 12.04⇤ 54
(8.15) (8.75) (9.26) (10.46)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
⇤ denotes (joint) maximum profit conditional on message.
Table B3: Average Profit conditional on ECU sent and message concerning % of amount
returned by Receiver in previous round, Inaccurate treatment.
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Supplementary Information
Additional Econometric Analysis
In this section, we provide supporting evidence that could not be included in the text due
to space restrictions, but to which we refer in the text.
Table C1 displays the correlation coe cients between (i) gossip about points sent
by Investors and actual points sent; (ii) gossip about Agents’ type and their actual type;
(iii) gossip about proportion returned by Agents and actual proportion returned by Agents.
It displays the behaviour/message correlation coe cients for the contents of the messages
sent, as well as the messages received. These two metrics di↵er in the Truth treatment be-
cause, here, sent messages were replaced with the summary of the Agents’ actual behaviour;
they di↵er in the Inaccurate treatment because of the 50% probability that messages were
misdirected.
Table C2 displays estimates of inaccuracy in Investor messages, comparing Inaccurate
and Gossip treatments.
Table C3 summarises regression estimates of determinants of single round Investor
trust as a function of reputation treatment. This replicates findings presented in the main
text by showing that levels of Investor trust do not di↵er at intercept across treatments, but
that trust levels increase across rounds in the Truth and Gossip treatments only.
Table C4 provides the estimates on which Figures 1 and 4 are based. Table C5
provides the estimates on which Figure 2 is based. Table C6 provides the estimates on
which both panels in Figure 5 are based. Table C7 provides the estimates on which Figures
3 is based. Table C8 provides regression model estimates of trust as a function of message
about Receiver type.
1
Messages Sent Truth Gossip Inaccurate
Agent Type 0.96 0.92 0.85
ECU Sent 0.96 0.80 0.83
ECU Returned 0.93 0.80 0.83
Messages Received Truth Gossip Inaccurate
Agent Type 1.00 0.92 0.27
ECU Sent 1.00 0.80 0.35
ECU Returned 1.00 0.80 0.26
Table C1: Correlation between messages sent, messages received and actual behaviour.
Notes: entries on cells are Spearman correlation coe cients. The top half of the table
displays the correlations between an Agent’s behaviour and messages sent about it; the bot-
tom half displays the correlations between messages received and the behaviour of the Agent
it is supposed to describe.
2
DV: Inaccuracy in Inaccuracy in Inaccuracy in
Receiver Type Message ECU Sent Message ECU Returned
Gossip -0.304⇤⇤⇤ -0.411⇤⇤⇤ -0.326⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.025) (0.039)
Constant 0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.506⇤⇤⇤ 0.513⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.018) (0.028)
Random E↵ects Parameters
Session parameter: < 0.001 (< 0.001) 0.001 (< 0.001) 0.001 (< 0.001)
Investor, intercept parameter: 0.001 (< 0.001) 0.001 (< 0.001) 0.001 (< 0.001)
Investor, residual: 0.361 (0.008) 0.410 (0.009) 0.446 (0.010)
N (obs, Investors) (1,080, 72) (1,080, 72) (1,080, 72)
Wald  2(3) 191.34, p < 0.001 272.04, p < 0.001 69.50, p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. ⇤⇤ : p < 0.01.
Table C2: Regression model estimates of inaccuracy in Investor messages, comparing In-
accurate and Gossip treatments. Notes: Model is a three-level random e↵ects maximum
likelihood regression model that nested rounds in participants in sessions; intercepts were
allowed to vary.
3
DV: ECU sent
Truth 0.006 (0.623)
Gossip 0.154 (0.623)
Inaccurate 0.555 (0.623)
Round -0.041 (0.028)
Truth⇥ Round 0.201⇤⇤ (0.040)
Gossip⇥ Round 0.177⇤⇤ (0.040)
Inaccurate ⇥ Round 0.036 (0.040)
Constant 5.119⇤⇤ (0.441)
Random E↵ects Parameters
Network: 0.407 (0.324)
Investor (intercept): 1.904 (0.141)
Investor (residual): 2.837 (0.045)
N (obs, Investors): (2,160, 144)
Wald  2(7) = 69.22, p < 0.0001
⇤⇤ : p < 0.01.
Table C3: Regression model estimates of Investor trust as a function of treatment. Notes:
Model was a three-level random e↵ects maximum likelihood regression model that nested
rounds in participants in sessions; intercepts were allowed to vary. No message treatment
provides the reference category.
4
DV % Returned By Agents ECU Sent
Truth ⇥ (Periods 1-5) 0.332⇤⇤⇤ (0.027) 5.567⇤⇤⇤ (0.531)
Truth ⇥ (Periods 6-10) 0.376⇤⇤⇤ (0.017) 6.539⇤⇤⇤ (0.675)
Truth ⇥ (Periods 11-15) 0.381⇤⇤⇤ (0.022) 7.106⇤⇤⇤ (0.663)
Gossip ⇥ (Periods 1-5) 0.340⇤⇤⇤ (0.010) 5.717⇤⇤⇤ (0.242)
Gossip ⇥ (Periods 6-10) 0.352⇤⇤⇤ (0.016) 6.389⇤⇤⇤ (0.248)
Gossip ⇥ (Periods 11-15) 0.369⇤⇤⇤ (0.012) 6.967⇤⇤⇤ (0.320)
Control ⇥ (Periods 1-5) 0.188⇤⇤⇤ (0.021) 5.067⇤⇤⇤ (0.350)
Control ⇥ (Periods 6-10) 0.169⇤⇤⇤ (0.029) 4.694⇤⇤⇤ (0.481)
Control ⇥ (Periods 11-15) 0.167⇤⇤⇤ (0.023) 4.606⇤⇤⇤ (0.487)
Inaccurate ⇥ (Periods 1-5) 0.260⇤⇤⇤ (0.011) 5.728⇤⇤⇤ (0.399)
Inaccurate ⇥ (Periods 6-10) 0.254⇤⇤⇤ (0.022) 5.528⇤⇤⇤ (0.285)
Inaccurate ⇥ (Periods 11-15) 0.283⇤⇤⇤ (0.027) 5.628⇤⇤⇤ (0.385)
N 1,883† 2,160
R2 0.74 0.74
Session-level clustered standard errors in parentheses.
⇤⇤⇤ : p < 0.01; †: 277 observations excluded due to 0 ECU sent.
Table C4: OLS estimates of percentage returned by Agents in 5-round blocks in all treat-
ments.
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DV: Negative Lie Positive Lie
PctRet 2 (0, 10] - - -0.031 (0.050)
PctRet 2 (10, 20] -0.181⇤⇤⇤ (0.060) 0.015 (0.032)
PctRet 2 (20, 30] -0.193⇤⇤⇤ (0.058) -0.008 (0.032)
PctRet 2 (30, 40] -0.207⇤⇤⇤ (0.057) -0.001 (0.027)
PctRet 2 (40, 50] -0.219⇤⇤⇤ (0.055) -0.030 (0.025)
PctRet 2 (50, 1] -0.153⇤⇤⇤ (0.069) -0.055 (0.042)
Constant 0.310⇤⇤⇤ (0.057) 0.087⇤⇤⇤ (0.026)
Random E↵ects Parameters
Network: <0.001 (<0.001) <0.001 (<0.001)
Investor (intercept): 0.193 (0.019) 0.134 (0.013)
Investor (residual): 0.255 (0.007) 0.225 (0.005)
N (obs, Investors): (830, 72) (975, 72)
Wald  2(2) = 18.24, p = 0.0027 Wald  2(6) = 5.19, p = 0.5201
Table C5: Estimates of Relative Frequency of Investor Lying as a function of Agent trust-
worthiness. Notes: Model was a three-level random e↵ects maximum likelihood regression
model that nested rounds in participants in sessions; intercepts were allowed to vary. Obser-
vations are restricted to cases where Investor sent a positive amount. PctRet 2 {0} was the
reference category for Positive Lies regression; PctRet 2 (0, 10] was the reference category
in the Negative lies regression, as negative lies were not possible if no amount was returned
by Agent. ⇤⇤⇤ : p < 0.01.
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DV: Payo↵ All Investors Agents High-Type Agent Low-Type Agent
Truth 16.560⇤⇤⇤ 15.035⇤⇤⇤ 18.156⇤⇤⇤ 25.926⇤⇤⇤ 10.385⇤⇤⇤
(0.976) (1.019) (1.136) (1.438) (0.971)
Gossip 16.882⇤⇤⇤ 14.881⇤⇤⇤ 18.883⇤⇤⇤ 27.678⇤⇤⇤ 10.089⇤⇤⇤
(0.407) (0.315) (0.841) (1.693) (0.491)
Control 13.297⇤⇤⇤ 9.693⇤⇤⇤ 16.902⇤⇤⇤ 21.478⇤⇤⇤ 12.326⇤⇤⇤
(0.627) (0.451) (1.379) (1.560) (1.268)
Inaccurate 14.814⇤⇤⇤ 11.061⇤⇤⇤ 18.567⇤⇤⇤ 25.441⇤⇤⇤ 11.693⇤⇤⇤
(0.573) (0.613) (1.116) (1.801) (0.579)
N 4,320 2,160 2,160 1,080 1,080
R2 0.65 0.79 0.63 0.73 0.69
Session-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. ⇤⇤⇤ : p < 0.01;
Table C6: OLS estimates of average payo↵s in all treatments.
Message about % returned by Agent
DV: ECU Sent {0} (0, 0.2] (0.2, 0.4] (0.4, 1]
Truth 2.146⇤⇤⇤ 3.792⇤⇤⇤ 6.233⇤⇤⇤ 8.725⇤⇤⇤
(0.656) (0.358) (0.394) (0.314)
Gossip 3.395⇤⇤⇤ 3.671 6.463⇤⇤⇤ 7.955⇤⇤⇤
(0.415) (0.429) (0.334) (0.270)
Inaccurate 4.500⇤⇤⇤ 4.143⇤⇤⇤ 5.984⇤⇤⇤ 6.962⇤⇤⇤
(0.215) (0.489) (0.421) (0.452)
N 219 179 405 591
R2 0.55 0.58 0.80 0.91
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ⇤⇤⇤ : p < 0.01.
Table C7: Average ECU sent conditional on message concerning % of amount returned by
Receiver in previous round.
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DV: ECU sent Truth Gossip Inaccurate
Constant 6.034⇤⇤⇤ 5.372⇤⇤⇤ 5.694⇤⇤⇤
(0.417) (0.417) (0.418)
High-Value Type 1.035⇤⇤⇤ 2.105⇤⇤⇤ -0.118
(0.265) (0.266) (0.268)
Random E↵ects Parameters
Network: 0.601 (0.270)
Investor (intercept): 1.689 (0.153)
Investor (residual): 2.930 (0.055)
N (obs, Investors): (1,512, 108)
Wald  2(1) = 81.30, p < 0.0001
⇤⇤⇤ : p < 0.01.
Table C8: Regression model estimates of trust as a function of message about Receiver
type. Notes: Model is a three-level random e↵ects maximum likelihood regression model
that nested rounds in participants in sessions; intercepts were allowed to vary. Coe cients
are interactions between IVs in first column with dummy IVs in the first row.
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